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Thus, under the authority of Deason v. Deason,78 Justice Heller
directed the City of New York to provide counsel or, in lieu of that,
to pay the fees of counsel selected by the defendant. He further recommended the amendment of the County Law,79 which now provides for
the assignment and compensation of counsel in criminal cases, to encompass indigent matrimonial defendants.
Much of the language of Vanderpool could be applied with equal
force to an indigent plaintiff in a matrimonial action. It remains to be
seen to what extent the courts will apply Boddie in this area as well as
in non-matrimonial civil litigation.8 0
ARTICLE

31 -DIscLOSURE

CPLR 3101(a): Appellate departments adopt a strict approach to discovery and inspection of insurance policy limits.
In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Court of Appeals, New
York case law remains uncertain on the issue of whether a plaintiff
in an automobile accident case can compel disclosure of a defendant's
automobile liability insurance policy limits."' Lower court cases arriving at conflicting results have differed in their interpretation of Allen
v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 2 wherein the Court of Appeals
adopted a liberal construction of CPLR 3101(a) so as to mandate
"disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which
will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing
delay and prolixity. 8'1 s Despite the broad scope of this test, the Second
and Third Departments have recently refused to require disclosure
of insurance coverage.
78 82 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1973), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 725, 731 (1973).
79 N.Y. CouNrY LAW art. 18-B (McKinney 1973).
80 The First Department, relying on Boddie, has held that an indigent tenant is en-

titled to assigned counsel and witness fees in an eviction proceeding. Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1971).
81 Compare Shutt v. Pooley, 43 App. Div. 2d 59, 349 N.Y.S.2d 839 (3d Dep't 1978)
(discovery disallowed); Mosca v. Pensky, 42 App. Div. 2d 708, 345 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't
1973) (mem.) (discovery disallowed); Fierman v. Cirillo, 40 App. Div. 2d 976, 338 N.Y.S.2d
285 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) (discovery disallowed); Sashin v. Santelli Constr. Co., 69 Misc.
2d 695, 330 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972) (discovery disallowed); Gold v.
Jacobi, 52 Misc. 2d 491, 276 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966) (discovery disallowed), with Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Ry. 302, 324
(1968) (very liberal disclosure policy enunciated); State Nat'l Bank v. Gregorio, 68 Misc.
2d 926, 828 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 Sr. JoHN's L. REV. 148, 170 (1973) (discovery allowed).
8221 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
83 Id. at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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In Fierman v. Cirillo, 4 the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed as an "improvident exercise of discretion"8 5 a lower
court order compelling discovery and inspection of a defendant's insurance policy. The reference to "discretion" in the Fierman memorandum led the Supreme Court, Westchester County, in Mosca v.
Pensky,s0 to infer that discovery of policy limits would not be denied
"tas a matter of law."8' 7 In Mosca, discovery proceedings had been completed and a statement of readiness had been filed when the motion
for disclosure was made,8 8 whereas disclosure had been sought at an
earlier stage in Fierman. Relying upon this distinction and upon the
liberal language of the Allen case, the Mosca court, after undertaking
a comprehensive review of the relevant authorities, granted a motion
for discovery and inspection of the defendant's policy.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, by a divided court, reversed the lower court's order.8 9 It refused to distinguish
its earlier decision in Fierman and added that "such disclosure in this
case should be denied as a matter of law."9 0 The Second Department
thus summarily set aside an opinion which had been praised as "the
most thorough analysis yet"9 1 of the issue. Subsequently, in Kenney v.
Angerer,92 the Second Department adhered to its position, again holding, over one dissent, that it was error as a matter of law to direct disclosure of policy limits.
In Shutt v. Pooley,93 the Third Department aligned itself with the
Second, adopting the view that a defendant's policy limits are not
"evidence material and necessary" 4 where ownership and control of a
84 40 App. Div. 2d 976, 388 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
85 Id., 838 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
8673 Misc. 2d 144, 841 N.YS.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), discussed
in The QuarterlySurvey, 47 Sr. JonN's L. REv. 725, 735 (1973).
87 Id. at 154, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
88 A rule promulgated by the Appellate Division, Second Department, prohibits disclosure proceedings after the filing of a note of issue and statement of readiness. 22

NYCRR 675.7. Its purpose is to discourage the placing of cases on the calendar which
are not yet ready for trial. The trial court in Mosca held that this rule did not bar discovery of policy limits after a case is placed on the calendar, reasoning that neither delay

nor prejudice results to any party from such disclosure.
89 42 App. Div. 2d 708, 345 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't 1973).
90 Id., 345 N.YS.2d at 607.
01 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 7 (1973).
92 42 App. Div. 2d 963, 347 N.YS.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1973).
93 43 App. Div. 2d 59, 349 N.Y.S.2d 839 (3d Dep't 1973).
94Id. at 62, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 843. The court relied primarily upon the reports of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure. The Committee originally proposed a
more liberal discovery statute than the present CPLR 3101. Commenting on the proposed provision, the Committee stated that it would not "permit discovery of the amount
of insurance in the average negligence case." Fnsrw REP. 118-19. The proposal was aban-

doned and the less liberal language of CPA 288 was adopted. The court in Shutt con-
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vehicle are not in issue and jurisdiction is not predicated upon attachment of the policy.95 While acknowledging the liberal approach
adopted by the Court of Appeals in Allen, the court feared that "[t]he
construction of subdivision (a) of CPLR 3101 so as to permit disclosure
of the insurance coverage would be more a rewriting than a liberal
interpretation of the statute."9 6
In light of the obvious reluctance of the appellate departments to
allow discovery of insurance policy limits, the Legislature should enact
a practice statute similar to rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure97 which allows such discovery. Disclosure in this critical area
has advantages which clearly outweigh opposing considerations."5 As
one commentator has noted
cluded, by a fortiori reasoning, that the present provision does not contemplate discovery
of insurance coverage.
95 Id. The court was here referring to two instances where discovery of insurance
actions where jurisdiction is
policy limits has been allowed. The first is in quasi in reifi
obtained by attachment of the policy under the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d
111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.Rd 99 (1966). In such cases, discovery is permissible because
the insurance policy is the subject matter of the action, Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). Discovery has also been allowed where the
fact of insurance is relevant to one of the material issues raised directly by the pleadings, i.e., ownership and control of a vehicle, See, e.g., Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449,
171 N.E.2d 454, 209 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1960).
96 43 App. Div. 2d at 61, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) reads in pertinent part: "A party may obtain discovery of
the existence of any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment. ..."
98 One argument advanced against allowing discovery of policy limits is that this
procedure will invade the defendant's right to privacy and ultimately pave the way to
discovery of his other assets. See Gold v. Jacobi, 52 Misc. 2d 491, 493, 276 N.Y.S.2d 309,
311 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966). The Advisory Committee to the United States Judicial
Conference saw little danger in this area, noting that insurance policies differ from other
personal assets of the defendant
(1) because insurance is an asset created specially to satisfy the claim; (2) because
the insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information
about coverage is available only from the defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.
Advisory Committee Notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970).
It has also been argued that an injured party has a discoverable interest in a defendant's policy. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951),
discussed in Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile
Tort Cases, 10 ALA. L. REv. 355, 360-61 (1958).
Another fear has been that disclosure of policy limits will encourage a plaintiff to
demand unreasonably high payments as a condition of settlement. See Note, Developments in the Law -Discovery, 74 I-Iv. L. REv. 940, 1018-20 (1961). In this connection
the Advisory Committee to the United States Judicial Conference found that
[d]isclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make the
same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are
based on knowledge and not speculation. It will conduce to settlement and avoid
protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite
effect.
Advisory Committee Notes, supra, at 499 (1970). With reference to New York practice,
Professor David D. Siegel has argued that
[T]he stronger case today is the one which permits disclosure of the policy limits
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[e]ach side is concerned with money, and damages cannot be separated from liability, even in the pretrial stages.... Just as the de.
fendant knows the amount of plaintiff's claim and can compel the
plaintiff to itemize his damages, the plaintiff should know whether,
if he proves his case, the judgment will be collectable. 99
The adoption of a rule similar to the one presently in force in the federal courts will help relieve calendar congestion by facilitating settlements of cases which cannot ultimately yield a monetary recovery demanded by the plaintiff ignorant of the defendant's policy limits.
ARTICLE 32 -

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CollateralEstoppel: Criminalconviction conclusively establishes underlying facts in subsequent civil action.
Traditionally, a criminal conviction has been considered merely
prima facie evidence of its underlying facts in subsequent civil litigation. However, the foundation case for this rule, Schindler v. Royal
Insurance Co.,' 00 has been discredited by the abandonment of the doctrine upon which it was based, i.e., the requirement of mutuality of
estoppel, 101 in favor of the two-fold test of Schwartz v. Public Administrator.0 2
Adopting the rationale of a 1972 First Department case,10 3 the
Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, recently put Schindler to
rest by holding that a contractor's conviction in federal court of using
interstate facilities to violate state bribery laws conclusively established
the illegality of the contract in a subsequent civil action between the
contractor and New York City. In S. T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New
even in in personam cases. There is little dispute that the purpose of the role
originally precluding the disclosure is that it would unduly prejudice the defendant's case in the eyes of the jury. As long as the policy and coverage is kept
away from the jury, the reason for the preclusive rule falls. Judges are generally

in agreement that knowledge of the policy limits often aids settlement talks. If
that is so, there is every reason for permitting the disclosure.

7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 8 (1973).
00 Davis, Pre-trial Discovery of Insurance Coverage, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1047, 1056-57

(1970).

100 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
101 See Albero v. State, 26 N.Y.2d 630, 255 N.E.2d 724, 307 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1970) (mem.);
Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E,2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); B.R.
De Witt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
102 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 135, 144 (1969). The two prerequisites for the application
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel are: first, the decisive issue in the present action
and the previously decided issue must be identical; and second, there must have been a
full opportunity to contest the issue now in dispute in the prior action.
103 See Vavolizza v. Krieger, 39 App. Div. 2d 446, 336 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1st Dep't 1972),
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 308 N.E.2d 439, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1974). The appellate division
opinion is discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Ry. 580, 594 (1973).

